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ABSTRACT	  
This paper investigates the effect of ownership characteristics on US banks’ accounting 
quality from a stakeholder perspective. The accounting quality within the banking industry is 
of major importance for the domestic financial stability as banks are the core of financial 
intermediations. Impairment of credit loans is an accounting area exposed to the subjective 
judgment of managers since the regulation for financial instruments is principle based, giving 
managers a leeway when determining the loan loss provision. Given the leeway, managers 
might have certain incentives to manipulate loan loss provisions in order to obtain different 
objectives. The nature of the owners and consequently the unique characteristics of different 
ownership forms are hypothesized to affect the managers’ incentives in various ways. As a 
result of manipulation or inaccurate estimations of loan loss provisions the accounting quality 
is affected negatively as the financial reports do not reflect the reality, and banks can be 
perceived to have lower risk than they actually have. By collecting data from American 
private, listed and savings banks between 2003 and 2013 a regression analysis is performed 
to examine the differences in accounting quality between the ownership forms. The findings 
document that accounting quality in listed banks is lower compared to non-listed banks. 
However, the accounting quality regarding other ownership forms was not proven to 
differ.  The results of this study contributes to the field by providing additional knowledge of 
how different ownership constellations might affect the accounting quality in the banking 
industry and consequently, the quality of information provided to stakeholders. The 
knowledge could benefit several stakeholders, for example to enable bank regulators to 
choose the proper set of regulations.  
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ABBREVATIONS	  AND	  DEFINITIONS	  	  
 
FAS  Financial Accounting Standards 
FASB  Financial Accounting Standards Board 
FDIC  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, bank regulator in the 
United States 
GCO  Gross Charge-Offs, the actual credit loss of the bank  
IAS  International Accounting Standards 
IASB  International Accounting Standards Board 
IFRS   International Financial Reporting Standards 
Listed bank  a bank publicly traded on a stock market 
LLP  Loan Loss Provisions, the expense account for estimated future 
credit losses 
OCC  the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, bank regulator in 
the United States 
Private bank  a bank owned by private shareholders 
Savings bank   a mutually held bank, owned by its depositors.  
SEC  US Securities and Exchange Commission, bank regulator in the 
United States 
US GAAP  Generally Accepted Accounting Principles in the United States 
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1.	  INTRODUCTION	  
This chapter gives the reader an overview of the investigated field, which facilitates the 
reading and understanding of this study. The reader is given a background to the problem 
leading up to the research questions and the purpose of the study. 
 1.1	  BACKGROUND	  
United Commercial Bank (UCB) was one of the 10 largest bank failures of the recent 
financial crises. In 2011, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) charged the former 
bank executives with concealing losses from the bank’s auditors and misleading investors 
about loan losses during the financial crises in 2008 and 2009, as they did not report accurate 
loan loss allowances. This caused the bank’s holding company to understate their operating 
losses in 2008 by approximately 50 %. Continuing declines of the bank’s loan values caused 
the bank to be declared bankrupt a year later. Since deposits are insured by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the bankruptcy of United Commercial Bank caused a 
loss of $2.5 billion to the FDIC’s insurance fund (SEC, 2011). The consequences of the 
actions of UCB’s managers illustrate the importance of high accounting quality within the 
banking industry.  
 
Banks have an important role in financial crises. There have been several studies concerning 
what caused the recent financial crises of 2008, which resulted in a near collapse of the 
financial sector and resulted in the greatest economic contraction in the US since the Second 
World War. According to Barth and Landsman (2010) most researchers agree that the 
bursting of the US housing bubble started the crisis. When the bubble burst these loans 
defaulted causing the banks to suffer severe credit losses, which resulted in bankruptcy of 
several banks including high profile institutions such as Lehman Brothers. Bank failures can 
lead to major consequences for the domestic financial stability, as it did in the financial crisis 
of 2008.  
 
Accounting quality can be measured in various ways; this study uses the measurement of 
loan loss provisions’ predictive power of gross charge-offs. Similarly to Altamuro and Beatty 
(2010), the actual quality of loan loss provisions is investigated by using loan loss provisions 
as the explanatory variable to gross charge-offs, which are the actual credit losses. Low 
predictive power indicates a low accounting quality, and consequently a low quality of the 
information provided to stakeholder. Bank regulators use the financial statements as inputs to 
calculate regulatory capital measures, and thus the risk of the banks. When the accounting 
quality is low the financial statements does not reflect the reality, and banks can be perceived 
to have lower risk than they actually have. This further emphasis the importance of the 
information quality provided to stakeholders in financial statements.  
 
Loan loss provision is an accounting area where estimates are of significance, and the accrual 
is relatively large since loans are the main part of banks’ assets. As a result, inaccurate loan 
loss provisions are often found to be an underlying factor to bank failures (Ahmed et al., 
1999; Gebhardt & Novotny-Farkas, 2011), as in the example of the UCB. Therefore, a 
correct estimate of credit losses is an important factor to avoid default as the provisions then 
absorb the estimated credit losses without an effect on the equity. The regulation for financial 
instruments and thus impairment of credit loans is principle based, and requires managers’ 
professional judgment to adjust the loan loss reserves. This gives managers a leeway when 
estimating loan loss provisions, and makes it possible for them to use it as a tool for income 
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smoothing. Prior research has found that managers have different incentives for manipulating 
loan loss provisions, where earnings management and capital management are the two most 
common incentives (see e.g. Lobo & Yang, 2001; Bouvatier & Lepetit, 2008; Moyer, 1990; 
Beatty et al., 2002; Ahmed et al., 1999).  
 
Different ownership structures possess different characteristics and operational goals, which 
expect to affect managers’ incentives in various ways and therefore also the accounting 
quality. Ownership structure can be defined by both the degree of ownership concentration 
and the nature of the owners (Iannotta, et al., 2007), this study investigates the latter. A 
distinction is made based on the nature of the banks’ owners, or in other words what type of 
owners the banks have. Three different types of ownership natures are investigated: private 
banks, listed banks and savings banks. The majority of US banks are private banks (Micco et 
al., 2007) and their characteristics distinguish them from listed and savings banks, why a 
comparison of the three ownership structures would be of interest. As state and cooperative 
banks represent a minority of US banks, it was not possible to collect a sufficient sample. 
Therefore, they are excluded in this study in contrast to similar studies of European Banks 
such as Altunbas et al. (2001). 
 
The US has historically been, and still is, a large economy; consequently US banks may 
impact the global financial stability to a larger extent than other countries’ banks. For 
example, as mentioned earlier, the US housing bubble and the failure of large US banks are 
argued to be two of the main causes to the global financial crisis of 2008 (Bart & Landsman, 
2010). This increases the need of a stable US banking sector with a sound accounting quality. 
Furthermore, US banks have a longer history of loan loss provisions compared to European 
banks, which results in better data regarding loan loss provisions and gross charge-offs for 
US banks in databases. Other researchers have noticed this data to be missing for many 
European banks (see e.g. Marton & Runesson, 2012; Gebhardt & Novotny-Farkas, 2011). 
But since the US and Europe have similar regulation and economic environment, the results 
of this US study could be projected to the European banks to some extent (Anandarajan et al., 
2007). 
 
This study contributes to the field by providing additional knowledge of how different 
ownership constellations might affect the accounting quality in the banking industry and 
consequently, the quality of information provided to stakeholders. The knowledge could 
benefit several stakeholders. For instance, the supervision and analysis of banks could 
become more precise if the analyst understands the impact of ownership structure on 
provisions. Bank regulators could also benefit from a wider understanding of how ownership 
impacts accounting choices in order to choose the proper set of regulations. 
 
The structure of this paper is influenced by the master degree study by Danielsson and 
Groenenboom (2013), and is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents the empirical context 
such as definitions of the different ownership forms, the regulatory environment concerning 
financial instruments, loan loss provisions, accounting quality and the different management 
incentives. Chapter 3 connects how different ownership structures are assumed to affect 
management’s incentives and the hypotheses are developed. Models used to test the 
hypotheses are illustrated in Chapter 4, while Chapter 5 presents the test results, which are 
analyzed in Chapter 6. The study’s findings and suggestions of further research are presented 
in Chapter 7.  
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1.2	  PURPOSE	  
The purpose of this paper is to provide additional knowledge of how different nature of 
owners might affect the accounting quality within the banking industry, and thereby the 
quality of information provided to stakeholders. 
 1.3	  RESEARCH	  QUESTIONS	  
• Does the nature of the bank owners (in savings, private and listed banks) affect 
accounting quality? If so, how do they differ from each other?  
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2.	  EMPIRICAL	  CONTEXT	  
The following chapter describes the empirical context to facilitate the readers’ understanding 
of the study. First, definitions of the different ownership structure are presented. Secondly, 
the reader is introduced to the regulatory environment concerning US banks and financial 
instruments. A comparison with the regulatory environment in Europe intends to enable the 
reader to apply the result of this study to the European banking sector. Thereafter, loan loss 
provisions are explained along with the definition of accounting quality. Lastly, the different 
incentives are discussed, which have been distinguished by prior research to be underlying 
reasons for the banks’ management to manipulate loan loss provisions.  	  2.1	  OWNERSHIP	  
There are two dimensions to ownership structure: the degree of ownership concentration and 
the nature of the owners, this study focuses on the latter. Differences may exist if the bank is 
privately, publicly or mutually held, since the nature of the owners and their characteristics 
are different in the respective ownership forms (Iannotta et al., 2007). 
 
2.1.1	  SAVINGS	  BANKS	  
US savings banks were originally intended to service “poor and financially uneducated 
people” as the “safe and convenient place to save” (Benston, 1972, p 197). The deposits 
could be for as little as one dollar and were invested in prescribed safe assets, distributing 
earnings back to the depositors through dividends (Wadhwani, 2011). Altunbas et al. (2011) 
identified the characteristics of European savings banks as offering deposit and lending 
activities to middle and low-income customers within the local area of the bank. Tabak et al. 
(2013) confirm this for US savings banks by stating that they have a stronger regional focus 
of operation than other American banks. The provided services of today’s savings banks are 
more diversified, but still involve more traditional financial intermediation activities than 
private banks. Furthermore, mutually owned banks1 have been found to hold better loan 
quality and lower asset risk (Iannotta et al., 2007). As the mission of savings banks is focused 
on the local region the characteristics can vary in different countries, and even within the 
country. 
 
Savings banks are not for profit institutions without capital stock, mutually owned by their 
depositors (Kelly et al., 2012; Colantuoni, 1998). As the owners also are the customers 
causes a shift in focus from shareholders to stakeholders. US savings banks separate the right 
to earnings from the right to control management. The depositors have a right to dividends, 
but do not hold the rights to choose management or set its rules, in contrast to shareholders. 
Instead, an independent board of trustees holds the legal control and manages the bank. The 
trustees are legally prohibited to receive any direct financial benefits for their services and 
cannot benefit from opportunistic behavior by the firm (Wadhwani, 2011).  
 
With no tradable shares and the lack of pressure from depositors, the motivation of savings 
banks’ managers to serve the public needs and operate their banks efficiently has been 
questioned since managers cannot gain or lose from changes in the banks’ shares. However, 
they can gain from higher salaries if the bank performs well, which could mean that they do 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Iannotta et al.’s (2007) classification of mutually held banks includes additional bank forms other than mutual 
savings banks	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not act any differently than private managers. When there are no shareholders to depend on 
for capital, managers have less need to be perceived as attractive investments and are not 
subject to the pressure from shareholders to maximize their value, in contrast to private 
banks. (Benston, 1972) 
 
2.1.2	  PRIVATE	  BANKS	  
The majority of banks in the industrial world, and consequently in the US, are privately 
owned (Micco et al., 2007). A private bank is owned and run for profit by its shareholders, 
who can be one or several individuals or corporations. Compared to savings banks, the 
ownership in private banks is based on the proportion of shares of a specific shareholder. In 
addition, the shares can have different voting rights. The shares of private banks are rarely 
traded since ownership generally is concentrated. Private banks provide a wider range of 
services compared to savings banks, in addition to accepting deposits and issuing loans they, 
for example, assist with investments and to hedge against various risks exposures. As private 
banks are profit maximizing, they have been found to be more efficient and profitable than 
mutually held banks (Sapienza, 2004; Iannotta et al., 2007).  
 
As the ownership is more concentrated and the shares in private banks are rarely traded, the 
owners’ involvement in management and operations is higher compared to in publicly held 
firms. Therefore, private owners are assumed to not rely on simple earnings reports to 
determine managers’ compensation, but instead on more subjective measures since they 
monitor the managers’ work more directly (Beatty et al., 2002; Ke et al., 1999).  
 
2.1.3	  LISTED	  BANKS	  
Listed banks are similar to private banks regarding for example operations and type of 
customers. The main goal is, likewise private banks, assumed to be more focused on 
maximizing profit and shareholder value. The biggest difference lies within ownership as 
listed banks are publicly traded on stock markets making it possible for anyone to buy shares. 
As a result it is generally more common for listed banks to have a dispersed ownership 
concentration compared to private banks (Beatty et al., 2002).  
 
Listed banks have larger access to external equity financing as their shares are traded on an 
open market. This makes the stock price an important factor for the banks’ ability to attract 
capital. In order to maintain their stock price, and be perceived as a low risk bank, the listed 
banks need to present stable earnings (Anandarajan et al., 2007; Fonseca & González, 2008). 
Managers of listed banks might face more pressure to report consistently increasing earnings 
and thus have more incentives to use discretion in their loan loss provisions to avoid declines 
in earnings (Beatty et al., 2002). Bouvatier et al. (2014) sum up the conclusions of prior 
research to be that managers of listed firms might have high incentives to report earnings that 
are perceived as more favorable by potential investors in order to attract capital. However, 
their own findings indicated otherwise which could be explained by investors’ demand of 
high accounting quality, forcing listed banks to have high accounting quality in order to be an 
attractive investment.  
 
To increase the managers’ incentives to act accordingly with the owners’ goals, listed banks 
often provide ‘pay for performance’ compensation (Anandarajan et al., 2007). Since listed 
banks have tradable shares the compensation system can be, in addition to earnings, based on 
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the stock price. A system that has been proven to create a short term focus of managers to 
increase the stock price and beat analysis forecasts (Cornett et al., 2009).  
 
Furthermore, publicly traded banks are subject to stronger enforcement in form of both public 
and private control (Marton & Runesson, 2012; Anandarajan et al., 2007). In addition to 
federal and state regulation, they have to follow the specific regulation of the stock market 
they are listed in. Listed banks and their managers are also subject to the public supervision 
of stock analysts and media journalists.  
 2.2	  REGULATORY	  ENVIRONMENT	  	  
2.2.1	  COMPARISON	  OF	  US	  GAAP	  AND	  IFRS	  	  
Since this study focuses on US banks it is motivated to compare the US standards to the 
standards of another leading economic area, the European Union (EU). The comparison 
provides the reader knowledge of the applicability of the results of this study to banks in the 
EU.  
 
US banks follow the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP), which are set 
by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). The European banks follow the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), set by the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB). Generally IFRS are more principle based than US GAAP, but 
regarding standards for financial instruments both standards are principle based. According to 
the Conceptual Framework of respective standards, the general purpose of financial 
reporting, and the users, are the same. The purpose is to provide financial information that is 
useful to the users, and supports their decision-making. The users are identified as existing 
and potential investors, lenders and other creditors (FASB, 2010; IASB, 2010). 
  
The decisions regarding loan loss provisions are considered to be a rather complex process, 
and since the standards for financial instruments are principle based, the determination of 
loan loss provisions require a professional judgment of managers (Hasan and Wall, 
2004).  Currently, US GAAP and IFRS use the ‘incurred loss model’ to determine loan loss 
provisions.2 In short, the model states that the impairment of loans should be recognized 
when there is objective evidence of impairment due to an occurred event (see further in 
section 2.3). The criticism of the incurred loss model is that the recognition of external 
indicators, such as bursting housing bubbles, effect is delayed compared to more future-based 
loss models (Wall & Koch, 2000; Barth & Landsman, 2010). Therefore, the standard setters 
have started a project together to replace the old respective standards, regarding financial 
instruments. As the IAS 39 is to be replaced by IFRS 9 Financial Instruments, the IASB has, 
in their most recent exposure draft regarding the matter (ED/2013/3 Financial Instruments: 
Expected Credit Losses), proposed an ‘expected loss model’ which is more forward-looking, 
for example it would take into account historical credit losses for similar instruments. In 
FASB’s Exposure Draft Financial Instrument - Credit Losses (Subtopic 825-15), a similar 
approach of an expected credit loss model is emphasized. Marton and Runesson (2012) 
investigated the difference in LLP’s predictive power between the current incurred loss 
model and the expected loan loss model used by local GAAPs, prior to the implementation of 
IFRS in Europe. They found that the incurred loss model decreases the validity of loan loss 
provisions compared to the prior expected loss model. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  For IFRS, see IAS 39; US GAAP, see e.g. ASC 450-20 and ASC 310-10-35	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2.2.2	  BANK	  REGULATORS	  
Besides the financial reporting standards, banks in both EU and US have to adapt their 
financial reporting according to specific bank regulators. Their main purpose is to control 
banks’ financial risk, which for example is made by setting requirements of minimum levels 
of capital-adequacy ratios and disclosure of additional information regarding assets and 
liabilities (Barth & Landsman, 2010). On a global basis, the main regulator is Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), which issues the Basel Accords. Regarding the 
US, the main regulators are the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) (Agur, 2013). One of the objectives of the Federal Reserve is to 
implement the Basel Accords in the US. Another federal regulator is the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), whose mission is to protect investors, and oversee the 
corporations that trade securities, for example banks (SEC, 2014). They require public banks 
to disclose important financial information to the public, and investigate banks they suspect 
of violating regulations. SEC can order banks to correct their financial statements, for 
example when banks failed to establish an appropriate loan loss allowance. Furthermore, 
savings banks are also chartered, regulated and supervised by the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (OCC). OCC can issue rules and regulations, examine banks and take 
supervisory actions against banks or managers that do not comply with the regulation (OCC, 
2014). 
 
In addition to the federal regulators, bank’s financial reporting might also be influenced by a 
local regulator or local laws, specific for the bank’s state (US) or country (EU) (Tabak et al., 
2013; Agur, 2013). In other words, the US has a dual banking system where banks are subject 
to both federal and state law.  
 
2.2.3	  CAPITAL	  REGULATION	  	  
The capital regulations in the US are mostly aligned with the Basel regulation, and divides 
bank’s total regulatory capital into two tiers: Tier 1 and Tier 2. Tier 1 is the core capital and 
regulators view it as a core measurement of bank’s financial strength. Loan loss provisions 
are not included in Tier 1 capital, therefore an increase in loan loss provisions reduces Tier 1 
capital as it decreases earnings and equity that otherwise would be included in Tier 1 capital. 
Tier 2 is supplementary capital and considered to be less reliable than Tier 1 capital. Loan 
loss provisions can be included in Tier 2 capital but only up to a maximum of 1.25 % of risk-
weighted assets (12 C.F.R. § 325 Appendix A). Consequently, an increase in loan loss 
provisions increases Tier 2 capital if the upper bound is not yet reached. An increase in loan 
loss provisions has opposing effects on Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. In prior regimes, loan loss 
provisions were included in Tier 1 capital why capital management through loan loss 
provisions was more common in the old regime (prior to 1990)  (Ahmed et al., 1999).    
 
Banks have to comply with different capital ratios levels regarding both Tier 1 and Tier 2 
capital. There are different capital categories with different requirements level. For example, 
to be categorized as an “adequately capitalized bank” the requirements are: Tier 1 capital to 
risk-weighted assets ratio minimum of 4 % and total capital to risk-weighted assets ratio 8 % 
or higher. A bank is categorized as “undercapitalized” if above ratios are not met, and then 
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have to submit a capital restoration plan3 (12 C.F.R. § 325.103). Prior research has shown 
that capital management via loan loss provisions has decreased post implementation of new 
and stricter capital rules (see e.g. Ahmed et al., 1999).  
 2.3	  LOAN	  LOSS	  PROVISIONS	  
The intention of loan loss provisions in regulatory standards, such as IFRS and US GAAP, is 
to provide an assurance to cover future expected loan losses due to e.g. bankruptcy of debtors 
or other scenarios where the bank is unable to collect the whole amount of the loan contract. 
Therefore, the accumulated loan loss provisions in the balance sheet, called loan loss 
allowance, are supposed to reflect the estimated future loan losses. In order to explain the 
effects of earnings and capital management by manipulating loan loss provisions, this section 
explains loan loss provisions’ basic effects on reported income. 
 
As mentioned earlier, banks follow the incurred loss model. Simplified, the incurred loss 
model and loan loss provisions can be explained by the following example: if a big company 
with employees in a smaller town bankrupts a few weeks before the bank’s closing 
accounting day, there might not yet be any defaulting loans, but the bank knows that a large 
portion of them will default in the near future due to the bankruptcy. The bank’s management 
has to take this into consideration when estimating the future loan loss. On the other hand, if 
the company is declared bankrupt after the closing accounting day, but before the financial 
statements are produced, managers are not allowed to take the expected credit losses into 
consideration even though they are certain of their existence. If the expected loan losses 
exceed the bank’s loan loss allowance account, an increase of the allowance is made by 
increasing loan loss provisions for the given period. When loan loss provisions increase, it 
reduces net income, which means that the expected credit loss is recognized in the period it 
occurred.  
 
In the income statement, loan loss provision is considered as a non-cash expense account, 
which lowers the reported income. In the balance statement, loan loss provisions are 
accumulated and displayed as loan loss allowance with a discount for net charge-offs and 
other. Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011) visualized this by using the following 
equation:                 
 𝐿𝐿𝐴!   =   𝐿𝐿𝐴!!!   +   𝐿𝐿𝑃!   −   𝑁𝐶𝑂!   +   𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟                  
   Where,  
   LLA= Loan loss allowances 
   LLP = Loan loss provisions in period t 
   NCO = Net charge-offs, the actual credit losses in period t, with subtraction of recoveries 
   Other = Adjustments to foreign exchange rates or changes in the scope of consolidation 
 
Eventually, when the loans default, the charge-offs reduce the loan loss allowance instead of 
directly affecting net income, which means that it is not recognized as an expense in period t 
but in the period when it occurred via LLP (Wall & Koch, 2000). Consequently, the gross 
charge-offs represent the bank’s actual credit loss. In the equation above the gross charge-
offs can be derived by adding the recoveries to net charge-offs.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  For a more detailed definition and explanation of the various components of regulatory capital see 12 C.F.R. § 
325.103  published by the FDIC available at www.fdic.gov	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Given the fact that the loan loss provisions are influenced by subjective estimations, it gives 
management the opportunity to use loan loss provisions as a tool to smooth the reported 
income by making larger provisions in good times and reclaims them in a downturn to absorb 
credit losses (Fonseca & González, 2008; Cornett et al., 2009). It also gives managers the 
opportunity to use loan loss provisions as a tool to manage capital to reach regulatory capital 
levels. The incentives for management to exercise these opportunities are discussed in section 
2.5. 
 2.4	  ACCOUNTING	  QUALITY	  	  
There are different measures to describe accounting quality within firms. For financial firms, 
and more precisely banks, their ability to estimate future credit losses is a frequently used 
measurement (see e.g. Marton & Runesson, 2012; Altamuro & Beatty, 2010). As described in 
the previous section, banks make an accrual each year in order for their loan loss allowance 
to reflect the expected credit loss. When the credit loss is a fact, a charge off to the allowance 
is made, making gross charge-offs a reflection of the actual loan losses. If the bank has made 
an accurate estimate of their credit losses there should be no significant difference between 
their provisions and their gross charge-offs. In contrast, if there is a large difference, the bank 
has not been successful in their estimation of its future credit losses. A smaller residual 
between loan loss provisions and gross charge-offs in the subsequent year indicates a higher 
accounting quality. Inaccurate estimations and manipulation of loan loss provisions occur at 
the expense of the quality of the information provided to the bank’s stakeholders, and results 
in misleading information about the bank’s financial condition (Wetmore and Brick, 1994). 
The misguidance of information due to manipulation of loan losses is directly contrary to the 
main purpose of the financial statements constituted under US GAAP.  
 2.5	  MANAGEMENT	  INCENTIVES	  
Bank managers possess more information regarding risks in the banks’ loan portfolio 
compared to outside investors, since the latter mainly possess the information provided in the 
financial statements. In order to provide accurate information to the investors, the managers’ 
professional judgment is a necessity when estimating loan loss provisions. On the other hand, 
decisions influenced by subjective judgment also gives managers the possibility to use 
discretion in estimating the size and timing of loan losses to manage earnings, and thereby 
pursue own objectives (Whalen, 1994; Bouvatier & Lepetit, 2008). The underlying 
motivations for managers’ estimation of provisions have been widely investigated in prior 
research. Lobo and Yang (2001) identified four motivations which have been suggested by 
prior research to exist as: 1) income smoothing, 2) capital regulation, 3) signaling and 4) tax 
considerations. Given the extent of this paper it focuses on the first two motivations since 
they have been found to be the stronger incentives (Anandarajan et al., 2007). When 
analyzing the accounting quality these two underlying motivations are used in this study to 
identify the different incentives of respective form of ownership. 
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2.5.1	  EARNINGS	  MANAGEMENT	  INCENTIVE	  
The first motive for managers’ estimation of loan loss provisions is to manage earnings to 
obtain a predefined income level, often in order to meet forecasts or stable earnings. The act 
of earnings management can be seen as a measure to obtain smoothed income, which is a 
well-addressed topic of research in various types of industries. Copeland (1968, p 101) states 
that “one manipulating goal widely attributed to management is the desire to smooth reported 
income”, and describes income smoothing as the means to “moderate year-to-year 
fluctuations in income by shifting earnings from peak years to less successful periods”. Every 
industry has its own specific approach to use the leeway given by the accounting standards. 
Loan loss provisions are a non-cash expense and the regulatory principles give banks a 
leeway to determine the size of the annual provision. Therefore, the main approach in the 
banking industry is to use loan loss provisions to smooth income (Cornett et al., 2009). 
Fonseca and González (2008) made a cross-country study, and found that the incentives for 
income smoothing vary depending on different aspects. Their findings suggest that the 
incentives to smooth earnings decrease with stricter legal enforcement while it increases with 
market orientation and development of the financial system in a country. Rivard et al. (2003) 
identify two main reasons to why bank managers use earnings management: 1) to increase 
their own compensation and 2) to report a stable income and appear as less risky. 
 
The first reason to engage in earnings management is to obtain higher earnings in the short 
term. When managers’ compensation system is connected to the firm’s performance or stock 
price it might increase the incentives to manage earnings on a short term. As compensation is 
tied to earnings, managers can use different accounting choices to accomplish income 
growth, and thereby increase their own compensation (Fields et al., 2001; Rivard et al., 
2003). For example, Cornett et al. (2009) present empirical findings that CEO’s pay-for-
performance increases earnings management when incentive-based stock options make a 
large proportion of the CEO’s total compensation. This can increase the incentives to engage 
in earnings management as higher earnings or a stable income can have as a positive effect 
on the stock-price. Furthermore, Cheng and Warfield (2005) find that it is more likely for 
managers with high equity incentives to manage earnings in order to meet or beat analysis 
forecasts. 
 
The second reason to engage in earnings management is to present stable earnings. For 
various reasons, it is in the banks’ interest to be perceived by the market as bearing low risk 
(Rivard et al., 2003). Volatile earnings are one indicator of high risk whereby bank managers 
may aim to present a stable income to manage the perceived risk of the bank (Fonseca & 
González, 2008). This emphasizes that managers might build up loan loss provisions during 
good times, and reclaim it in a downturn to absorb losses and smooth income (Fonseca & 
González, 2008; Cornett et al., 2009). 
 
However, prior research is not completely unified in their conclusions to what extent loan 
loss provisions are used for earnings management in banks. Ahmed et al. (1999) do not find 
earnings management to be an important determinant for loan loss provisions. While other 
studies have found that listed banks engage in more earnings management than private banks 
(Beatty & Harris, 1999; Beatty et al., 2002; Anandarajan et al., 2007). Lobo and Yang (2001) 
find strong support for income smoothing via loan loss provisions, and Cornett et al. (2009) 
find evidence of a relation between loan loss provisions, pay-for-performance and earnings 
management. Furthermore, evidence is found by Lobo et al. (2013) who state that managers 
continue to seek different methods to achieve their own reporting objectives. In conclusion, 
the majority of analyzed prior research has found proof of earnings management. 
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2.5.2	  CAPITAL	  MANAGEMENT	  INCENTIVE	  
The second motive for managers’ estimation of loan loss provisions is managing capital 
levels to meet the regulatory capital ratio requirements set by bank regulators, which are 
discussed in section 2.2. This motive is closely related to earnings management as the capital 
levels are affected by loan loss provisions effect on earnings and hence the equity capital. 
Due to the high costs associated with the consequences of violating the capital restrictions 
banks might manipulate loan loss provisions to meet the restrictions (Ahmed et al., 1999; 
Marton & Runesson, 2012). The regulatory costs of violating the requirements can for 
example include that regulators refuse the bank to acquire other firms, pay dividends to 
shareholders, or demand a capital restoration plan; and if the ratios are under a certain level 
they might be forced into bankruptcy (Wall & Koch, 2000). When banks’ capital levels are 
low relative to the regulatory requirements, managers have incentives to manipulate loan loss 
provisions by avoiding writing off bad loans, to avoid the regulatory costs associated with the 
violation (Cornett et al., 2009; Moyer, 1990; Fonseca & González, 2008). 
 
Furthermore, if the credit losses exceed loan loss allowance it will decrease the equity capital 
when the expected future loan losses materialize (Cornett et al., 2009). This creates 
incentives to rather overstate the loan loss provisions to avoid a possible decrease in equity 
capital. 
 
Several studies have proven that managers use loan loss provisions to manage capital (e.g. 
Moyer, 1990; Beatty et al., 2002; Ahmed et al., 1999; Lobo and Yang, 2001). A recent study 
by El Sood (2012) examines US bank holding companies during 2001-2009. His empirical 
findings indicate that banks engage in income smoothing when they risk hitting the 
regulatory minimum capital requirements. However, other studies did not find evidence for it 
(see e.g. Bouvatier & Lepetit, 2008; Altamuro & Beatty, 2010) The inconsistent results can 
be explained by how the Basel Accord has affected the implications of loan loss provisions 
on capital-adequacy ratio (see section 2.2.3). For example, Marton and Runesson (2012) 
summarize existing research by stating that, especially after the introduction of the Basel 
Accord, there is little evidence for capital management via loan loss provisions. 	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3.	  HYPOTHESIS	  DEVELOPMENT	  	  
This chapter develops the hypotheses regarding the differences in accounting quality between 
ownership structures. The characteristics of respective ownership form are connected with 
their assumed effects on management’s incentives, and consequently, their effect on the 
accounting quality.  
 
Private banks have been identified as the most common ownership form in the banking sector 
(Micco et al., 2007). Therefore, this study tests the different ownership structures, savings 
and listed banks, against private banks to see if there is a difference in accounting quality due 
to the ownership structure. In addition, listed and savings banks are additionally tested 
against a control group including all other banks. 3.1	  SAVINGS	  BANKS	  
Savings banks are non-profit organizations without shares but instead mutually held, which 
shifts the focus from shareholders to stakeholders in form of depositors (Kelly et al., 2012; 
Colantuoni, 1998). Consequently, savings banks are associated with a lower focus of 
maximizing profits and shareholder value compared to private banks. Their different focus is 
assumed to result in less pressure on managers to meet expectations compared to private 
banks. Attempting to meet expectations has been proven to be an incentive for earnings 
management and might result in lower accounting quality (Cheng & Warfield, 2005). 
 
Managers of savings banks are assumed to be subject to less pressure from the owners 
compared to managers of private banks due to two factors. The first factor is that the 
depositors in savings banks do not hold the right to influence the management; instead an 
independent trustee is appointed (Wadhwani, 2011). This disables the depositors from 
pressuring managers and might decrease the extent of how much they supervise managers’ 
work and actions compared to what private shareholders might do, especially if the private 
ownership is concentrated to a few large shareholders. This could decrease managers’ 
incentives to produce high accounting quality and instead increase their incentives to exercise 
earnings management, which is assumed to have a negative effect on the accounting quality. 
The second factor is that savings banks do not hold a capital stock (Kelly et al., 2012), which 
suggests that they are not dependent on being perceived as attractive investments or subject 
to the pressure from shareholders to maximize shareholder value (Benston, 1972). As stable 
earnings increase the shareholder value and is a measure for low-risk investment (Fonseca & 
Gonzalez, 2008), savings banks’ managers might have less incentives to engage in earnings 
management compared to private banks. The second factor suggests a positive effect on 
accounting quality, compared to non-mutually held banks. 
 
According to Fields et al. (2001), managers’ incentives for earnings management increase 
when their incentives are aligned with those of the owners. This can for example occur when 
managers are compensated in shares. The absence of shares in savings banks might lower the 
alignment of incentives, and hence lower the incentives for earnings management. However, 
Benston (1972) argue that there is reason to believe they do not behave differently from 
managers in shareholder-owned institutions. Likewise mangers in private banks, savings 
banks’ managers have a desire for a successful firm, as they can personally gain from a 
growing institution in terms of higher salaries and recognition. 
 
As stated in chapter 2, the characteristics of savings banks have historically focused on 
providing loans to the low and middle class on a local geographic market (Altunbas et al., 
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2011). Even if savings banks are more diversified today, they still have a more traditional 
focus (Tabak et al., 2013). The traditional focus might affect the accounting quality in various 
ways. First, a larger share of loans provided to the low and middle class are associated with a 
higher degree of risk for default of loans. This argument is based on the hypothesis that 
people with lower income, to a larger extent than others, are affected by insolvency in 
general, and especially during an economic downturn. Private banks however have a more 
diverse set of borrowers, and consequently their loan portfolio is associated with a lower 
level of risk compared to savings banks. Secondly, the fact that savings banks are focused on 
a limited geographic market might further affect their ability to differentiate their loan 
portfolios, which increases the financial risk of the portfolio. This argument does not apply to 
private banks since they do not have the same regional focus. These two effects suggest a 
higher level of credit risk in savings banks compared to private banks and might affect 
savings banks’ managers in two ways. First, as it is of significance for all banks to be 
perceived as bearing low risk, managers of savings banks might have higher incentives to 
engage in earnings and capital management to conceal the higher risk. In prior research, 
stable earnings have been identified as an indication of lower risk (Rivard et al., 2003; 
Fonseca & González, 2008) Secondly, as discussed in section 2.2, bank regulators use the 
financial statements to compute the capital ratios. If the savings banks are indeed riskier it 
might enhance the incentives for savings banks’ managers to manipulate loan loss provisions, 
as an attempt to reach the regulatory capital requirements if their capital is insufficient 
(Moyer, 1990; Ahmed et al., 1999). This indicates that savings banks might have more 
incentives, compared to private banks, to use loan loss provisions for capital management, 
and consequently have a lower accounting quality than private banks. On the contrary, 
Iannotta et al. (2007) finds higher quality of assets and lower risk of mutually held banks, 
which would indicate lower incentives for capital management.  
 
In conclusion, there are various aspects arguing that the ownership characteristics of savings 
banks can contribute to either better or worse ability to predict GCO with LLP compared to 
private banks. To summarize, when including all perspectives, the incentives for earnings 
management seem to be lower for savings banks, while the incentives for capital 
management seem to be higher. As earnings management has been proven to be a stronger 
incentive than capital management in previous studies, especially after LLA was excluded 
from Tier 1 capital, the following hypothesis has been developed:  
 
H1a: The ability of LLP to predict GCO in the subsequent period is higher for savings banks 
than private banks. 
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Given the first hypothesis, the savings banks are also predicted to have better accounting 
quality when comparing with both private and listed banks. Therefore, a second hypothesis 
was developed:  
 
H1b: The ability of LLP to predict GCO in the subsequent period is higher for savings banks 
compared to all other natures of ownership. 
 3.2	  LISTED	  BANKS	  
As stated in section 2.1, listed banks are quite similar to private banks regarding operation, 
type of customers and goals of profit maximization. The main difference lie within ownership 
and the fact that listed banks have tradable shares on a stock market, which can affect 
managers’ incentives in various ways. For example, it is more common with dispersed 
ownership in listed banks compared to private shareholders, which might decrease the 
influence shareholders have over managers’ actions. Less influence give listed banks’ 
managers a greater leeway to make accounting choices to pursue own objectives, compared 
to private banks. Private shareholders, generally with larger proportion of shares per 
shareholder, might have a stronger influence on managers and a stronger involvement in the 
bank than owners of listed banks. This implies that the accounting quality would be lower in 
listed banks than in private banks. 
 
Furthermore, listed banks are dependent on the stock market as a source of capital, and 
therefore need to be perceived as attractive investments. As stable earnings are one indicator 
of a well-functioning bank with low risk, it may increase the incentives for managers to 
engage in earnings management. As prior research has found that publicly traded banks 
engage in earnings management to larger extent than other banks (Beatty & Harris, 1999; 
Beatty et al., 2002; Anandarajan et al., 2007), which might lead to lower accounting quality. 
 
It is also of importance to reach the regulatory capital ratios in order to be perceived with 
lower risk, and as the costs of not reaching them are high it is assumed to increase the 
incentives for capital management (Wall & Koch, 2000). The costs associated with not 
reaching capital ratio are presumably higher for listed banks compared to other banks. This is 
explained by the negative effect of a low capital ratio on the bank’s stock price. On the other 
hand, high accounting quality is of importance to potential investors, which might indicate 
that listed banks cannot engage in as much manipulation of loan loss provisions as private 
banks (Bouvatier et al., 2014).  
 
Another aspect of listed banks’ tradable shares is the possibility to tie managers’ 
compensation system to the value of the stock. As discussed in chapter 2, prior research has 
proved this system to increase managers’ incentives to engage in earnings management in 
order to meet or beat analysis forecast and increase the value of the stock in listed banks 
(Cornett et al., 2009; Cheng & Warfield, 2005). While compensation system is also 
incorporated in other bank forms, an additional factor is added to listed banks. The share-
based compensation system might lead to a short-term focus, which indicates larger 
incentives for earnings management in listed banks.  
 
Listed banks are subject to stronger enforcement and regulation than private banks (Marton & 
Runesson, 2012; Anandarajan et al., 2007). In addition to federal and state regulation, listed 
banks have to comply with the specific regulation of the stock market and supervision of e.g. 
stock analysts. As discussed in chapter 2, heavier enforcement has been proved to decrease 
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the incentives to manipulate loan loss provisions for capital management (Fonseca & 
González, 2008). Furthermore, a public listing status also leads to a larger public interest, 
which might attract additional supervision by journalists. A public exposure is assumed to 
affect listed banks to a larger extent than other banks, since the negative effect on the stock. 
This aspect would imply that listed banks have less incentive to engage in manipulation of 
loan loss provisions and consequently have a better accounting quality than private banks.  
 
In conclusion, there are various aspects arguing that ownership characteristics of listed banks 
can either contribute to better or worse ability to predict GCO with LLP compared to private 
banks, depending on managers’ incentives for earnings and capital management. Likewise, 
prior research regarding management's incentives for earnings and capital management via 
loan loss provisions has been inconsistent. However, listed banks seem to have more reasons 
to engage in earnings management. As for capital management, it is not as clear whether the 
certain characteristics would imply higher or lower incentives. Therefore, the following 
hypothesis has been developed: 
 
H2a: The ability of LLP to predict GCO in the subsequent period is lower for listed banks 
than private banks. 
 
Given that the certain characteristics of savings banks implies a higher accounting quality 
compared to private banks, it suggests that listed banks have lower accounting when 
comparing to all non-listed banks. Therefore, a second hypothesis was developed:  
 
H2b: The ability of LLP to predict GCO in the subsequent period is lower for listed banks 
compared to non-listed banks. 	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4.	  RESEARCH	  METHODOLOGY	  	  
This chapter describes the choice of research methodology and the process of data 
collection.  Firstly, the models used to test the hypotheses are described. Secondly, the reader 
is given a presentation of the data sources, the collection and how the data was processed. 
The discussion of certain advantages and disadvantages associated with the research 
methodology are addressed throughout the chapter, as the authors believe this concept will 
assist the understanding of certain choices.   
 4.1	  RESEARCH	  DESIGN	  
This study investigates how different forms of ownership might affect the accounting quality 
within the banking industry. The method used to reach conclusions of the research questions 
is a quantitative method, using statistical significance tests to verify the hypotheses developed 
in chapter 3. In order to conduct the tests, a collection of secondary data was retrieved from 
the Bankscope database. The database provides a vast amount of accounting data, which 
facilitates the use of a quantitative statistical method to analyze the relationship between the 
variables of interest. The process of data collection is presented more thoroughly in section 
4.2. 
 
4.1.1	  MODELS	  
Two regression models are used to conduct the tests, both derived from Altamuro and Beatty 
(2010). The regression models are ordinary least squares (OLS) models. Using an OLS model 
for a regression analysis of panel data is associated with some problems considering the 
cross-sectional variation of the data generated by specific individuals (banks) over time; 
hence a more refined model might be more suitable for this type of research. While other 
models, such as the generalized linear model, could be argued to provide better estimations, 
they also rely on a rather complex mathematical derivation, which makes it harder to evaluate 
the reliability of the results. The simplicity of OLS enables an easier interpretation of the 
results, without any advanced statistical knowledge. Furthermore, the OLS still provides 
sufficient measures to examine the research questions of this study. To deal with the 
weaknesses of OLS and to ensure the reliability of the models’ results, certain measures are 
taken regarding the variables, the data and the model itself. These measures are addressed in 
their specific context. Regarding the model, one of the underlying assumptions is the constant 
variance of the residuals (homoscedasticity). To confirm this assumption, a pre-test was 
conducted. The test showed a tendency of heteroscedasticity, for this reason the regression 
analysis is based on robust standards errors, which minimizes the risk for understating the p-
values. 
 
The models focus on predicting future gross charge-offs (GCO) using loan loss provisions 
(LLP) and a set of independent variables that varies with different natures of ownership. 
GCO and LLP are both continuous variables that can undertake any value, and their absolute 
values are naturally highly correlated with the size of the bank. As the sample consists of 
banks with various sizes, the variables GCO and LLP are scaled by using the observations of 
total assets in the beginning of the year as a measure of size. By scaling GCO and LLP the 
effect of the bank’s size on the variables is suppressed. In addition to the variables of interest, 
a number of control variables are included in the models to secure the causality of the 
interacting variables; these are discussed after the models. 
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MODEL 1 
The following model is used to test the “A” hypotheses of respective ownership form, how 
the accounting quality of savings or listed banks differs from private ownership. The model 
includes categorical dummies for savings and listed banks in order to distinguish private 
ownership. 
 𝐺𝐶𝑂!,!!! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐿𝐿𝑃!,! + 𝛽!𝑆𝐴𝑉!,! + 𝛽!𝐿𝐿𝑃!,! ∗ 𝑆𝐴𝑉!,! + 𝛽!𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇!,! + 𝛽!𝐿𝐿𝑃!,! ∗ 𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇!,!+ 𝜀!,! 
 
Where, GCOi,t+1 is gross charge-offs for bank i in year t+1, scaled with total assets in the 
beginning of the year. To predict values of the dependent variable (GCO) the model uses the 
independent variable LLPi,t, which is the observed value of loan loss provisions of bank i in 
year t, scaled with total assets in the beginning of the year. SAVi,t is a dummy variable which 
equals 1 if bank i is a savings bank in year t and 0 otherwise. LISTi,t is a dummy variable 
indicating if bank i is listed in period t, and equals 1 for a listed observation and 0 otherwise. 
As this model examines three types of ownership, private banks are the control group 
indicated by a value of 0 in both of the categorical dummies. The control group is the base of 
the regression and the coefficients of the categorical dummies indicate the relation to the 
control group of private ownership. The interaction terms, LLPi,t *SAVi,t and LLPi,t*LISTi,t, 
are the primary variables of interest, which measure the difference in loan loss provisions’ 
ability to predict gross charge-offs the subsequent year for respective ownership structure 
compared to private ownership. The coefficients of the interaction terms are central to the 
analysis of whether a certain ownership structure has higher or lower accounting quality 
compared to private ownership. 
 
MODEL 2 
The second model tests the “B” hypotheses of respective ownership structure, which examine 
whether the accounting quality of a specific ownership structure differs from the rest of the 
banks in the sample. Model 2 is similar to Model 1, but only uses one categorical dummy.  
 𝐺𝐶𝑂!,!!! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐿𝐿𝑃!,! + 𝛽!𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃!,! + 𝛽!𝐿𝐿𝑃!,! ∗ 𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃!,! + 𝜀!,! 
 
As in Model 1, the dependent variable is GCOi,t+1. LLPi,t is still used as the main predictor for 
GCO in the subsequent period. The ownership dummy is the indicator of whether an 
observation is included in the control group or not. Since model 2 is applied to test savings 
and listed banks’ accounting quality compared to the rest of the population of banks, the 
dummy variable equals 1 if the observation is included in the treatment group (savings or 
listed banks), and 0 otherwise.  
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4.1.2	  CONTROL	  VARIABLES	  
In addition to the variables described in the previous sections, the two models consist of a set 
of control variables. Control variables are used since the variation of GCO is assumed to be 
explained by additional variables, besides LLP and ownership structure. If these variables are 
excluded from the model there is a risk for omitted-variable bias. To overcome this problem 
the control variables are included in the model, with the effect that the variation of the 
dependent variable derived from the control variables is tied to them. Consequently, the 
variation explained by the variables of interest is cleared from variation of extraneous 
variables, which improves the validity of the results.  
 
To determine the control variables, it is important to include every variable that is considered 
to correlate with the variables of interest. The set of control variables used in this study is 
influenced by Perez et al.’s (2008) study, which examined the occurrence of LLP as a 
measure for earnings and capital management in Spanish banks, using a set of variables that 
are considered to affect loan loss provisions. Since their study was constructed of manually 
collected data, some alterations were made to suit the data set of this study. The following 
control variables are used for both models. The logarithm of total assets is used to capture the 
variation derived from the size of the bank.  Using logarithm of total assets normalize the 
observations. A variable of operating profit is included since it might affect the use of LLP as 
an income smoothing instrument. Total loans as a fraction of total assets is included as a 
measure of the bank’s general risk level. Total capital ratio is also a measure of risk level, 
but captures the variation generated by the risk of undercutting capital adequacy 
requirements. All observations of the control variables are the values in year t.  
 
In addition to the continuous control variables, the models consist of dummy variables 
representing each year of the timeframe (2003-2013). These variables capture the time 
variation of the observations. Another variable that might affect gross charge-offs is the 
general state of the economy. While the time variables control this to some extent, the annual 
change in GDP is a better indicator, but since annual GDP is constant over one year it is 
omitted when time dummies are included at the same time. Therefore, an additional test is 
conducted to control for annual GDP growth, when excluding year dummies. 
 
An obvious problem arising, when some of the above control variables are included, is the 
risk of multicollinearity, which can be hard to overcome without the risk of excluding a 
causal factor. In order to assure the validity of the results, the intercorrelation of the 
independent variables is observed cautiously, using the variance inflation factor (VIF). A VIF 
indicating a multicollinearity problem might lead to exclusion of one of the variables. 
 4.2	  DATA	  COLLECTION	  
4.2.1	  SOURCES	  	  
The main source of data for this study is the Bankscope database. According to Hasan and 
Wall (2004), the Bankscope database provides one of the widest set of data regarding 
financial information in banking organizations. Since this study relies on regression models 
the use of secondary data make it possible to collect a large sample size, which improves the 
models’ estimates. The vast amount of available data for US banks also enables the collection 
of sample statistics that provides a good measure for estimating the parameters of the 
population.  
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The disadvantage of using a method relying on secondary data is that the quality of the data 
cannot be completely ensured. Prior research have disputed the quality of the data of 
European banks in Bankscope, and have found a large proportion of missing and incomplete 
values concerning some of the variables used in this study (see e.g. Marton and Runesson 
2012; Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011). However, according to Gebhardt and Novotny-
Farkas (2011) the data of US banks are better covered. While it is not possible to control that 
all observations are correct, the fact that the Bankscope database is a commonly used data 
source in this field of research, emphasizes the reliability of the data.  
   
4.2.2	  SAMPLE	  OF	  BANKS	  
Since this study focuses on private and savings banks in the US, the data set is first restricted 
to active banks classified as either commercial banks, savings banks, real estate and mortgage 
banks or bank holdings and holding companies, located in the US. The second restriction is 
set to focus on banks that provide annual information of loan loss provisions and gross 
charge-offs in at least one of the years 2002-2012, respectively 2003-2013. Since the models 
predicts future gross charge-offs in year t+1 with observations of loss provisions in year t, the 
observations of loan loss provisions are lagging one year. As a third restriction, the data set is 
limited to banks with total assets of at least 1 billion USD, in at least one of the years 2002-
2013. This restriction is set since non-public banks with total assets below 1 billion USD are 
not subject to certain reporting requirements of FDIC4 and other regulatory standards such as 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) or others provided by U.S. Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) (FDIC, 2009). The third restriction ensures that observed banks are 
subject to similar regulations.  When conducting the tests the 1 billion-threshold of total 
assets is applied in Stata. After applying the above restrictions 2 506 banks remain. This 
represents the main sample of banks used to gather financial data of the variables included in 
the models. 
 
4.2.3	  THE	  PROCESS	  OF	  DATA	  COLLECTION	  
The process of data collection for this study contains some manual operations, which exposes 
the risk of human error. To minimize this risk, whenever a manual operation is conducted all 
observations are linked to a specific year and BvD ID number, stating which bank the 
observation is connected to. When restructuring the data the BvD ID numbers are compared 
using the EXACT function in Excel. 
 
The first step is to classify each bank as either savings bank or private bank. The 
classification is made by using Bankscope’s classification of specialization, and savings 
banks are coded as 1 while private banks are coded as 0. As a second step, the financial data 
of the variables included in the models are collected. The software (Stata), used to conduct 
the significance tests, requires the input of each variable to be structured in columns, which is 
not the case of the output from Bankscope. Therefore, the financial data of the variables is 
collected year by year to facilitate the restriction of the data. This process is rather simple and 
the risk of human error is minimal and is not further discussed. 
 
While the collection of data regarding the continuous variables is rather simple, it is more 
problematic to code the dummy variable regarding listing status. Bankscope only provides 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  The threshold of 1 billion dollars is applied since 2009, before the threshold was 500 million dollars (FDIC, 
2009)	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information regarding the current listing status, with statistic indicators characterized as 
listed, unlisted or delisted. Since this study uses observations during a period of 10 years, the 
listing status might have changed during the period, as indicated by the delisted 
characteristic. To overcome this issue, delisting date and initial public offering (IPO) date 
was retrieved. Cases of delisting and listing during the time period of the study were 
manually corrected for, using listing status at the closing date. The closing date in each 
historical period was assumed to be consistent with the latest closing date. 
 
Further issues that required manual alterations were associated with the year of the latest 
account. In Bankscope, financial data is structured as the observed values in year 0 equals the 
values of the latest account, meaning that banks with latest accounts that differ from 2013 is 
interfering the panel data. This occurred for 61 of the sampled banks and was manually 
corrected by deleting these observations. 
 
4.2.4	  DATA	  MODIFICATION	  
Before conducting the test, some data modifications were made to stabilize the results of the 
regression and to minimize the risk of measurement errors. The mathematical process 
underlying the OLS model is sensitive to extreme values, particularly in the dependent 
variable. Extreme values in the dependent variable generate both large error terms and tend to 
pull the fitted line towards extreme values, making the results of the regression unstable. 
Extreme values can be generated by either measurement errors or exceptional conditions 
regarding a specific bank or observation. With this background, a pre-test was made to locate 
if the data set contained any extreme values and also examine their effect on the regression 
results. The pre-test revealed some assumed measurement errors, mainly for observations 
below the threshold of 1 billion in total assets. Since the observations with less than 1 billion 
in total assets are excluded from the main test, they do not affect the results of the regression. 
For observations exceeding 1 billion in total assets, outliers in the first and 99th percentiles, 
for both GCO and LLP divided by total assets, were dropped to minimize the risk of 
measurement error. As GCO and LLP are this study’s main points of interest, only extreme 
values in those variables were dropped. 
 4.3	  FURTHER	  LIMITATIONS	  
Certain limitations regarding the OLS model and the data have been addressed in their 
respective context. Further limitations of this study are that the timeframe is set to 10 years, 
stretching back to reported values for LLP in 2002. This limitation is used because 2002 was 
the year of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which aimed to provide improved internal control and 
quality in financial reports (Altamuro & Beatty, 2010). For this study, it means that the 
financial reports’ figures used as input data are not influenced by any major regulatory 
changes. The timeframe of 10 years also made it possible to collect a sufficient number of 
observations of each ownership form. Consequently, the results of this study is limited to the 
accounting quality during the 10 years, and do not reflect conditions outside the timeframe. 
 
Furthermore, the classification of the certain bank types is solely based on the specialization 
given in Bankscope. As discussed earlier, it is not possible to control all banks, which means 
that there might be banks that are incorrectly classified. Since Bankscope covers banks on a 
global basis and the characteristics and origin of savings banks slightly differs between 
different regions, the risk for incorrect classification might be higher for savings banks.  
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5.	  EMPIRICAL	  FINDINGS	  
The first part of this chapter describes the characteristics of the sample used to conduct the 
test. Secondly, it presents the results of the regression models. 
 5.1	  DESCRIPTIVE	  STATISTICS	  
5.1.1	  OWNERSHIP	  DISTRIBUTION	  OF	  BANKS	  
The main sample used to collect the data consisted of 2 506 banks in total, and was retrieved 
after applying the three restrictions: at least one reported value of 1) gross charge-offs, 2) 
loan loss provisions and 3) 1 billion USD in total assets. Diagram 1 shows the sample of the 
banks’ distribution of ownership in the year of 2013. While this distribution is inconsistent 
over the timeframe of 10 years, due to the varying characteristic of listing status, the diagram 
should give an overview of the ownership characteristics of the banks.  
 
 
Diagram 1 – Ownership distribution of banks 
 
As seen in diagram 1, the sample of banks mainly consists of private banks, namely 1 830 in 
total. This was expected since privately owned banks are, as mentioned earlier, the most 
common ownership form of US banks. The number of listed banks is significantly smaller 
with 489 banks in total and the number of savings banks is the fewest with 187 banks. 	   	  
187
489
1830
Savings Listed
Private
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5.1.2	  OWNERSHIP	  DISTRIBUTION	  IN	  THE	  SAMPLE	  
The collected sample of 2 506 banks included a number of observations with missing values 
in all of the variables in the models, due to the restriction of ‘at least one value’ mentioned 
above. A natural reason for missing values is if a bank is founded during the study’s 
timeframe or if a bank, for some reason, did not provide its financials to the sources used by 
Bankscope. A comparison of the distribution of ownership in the final sample is illustrated in 
Diagram 2, including all observations that had at least one reported value for the variables 
included in the models.  
Diagram 2 – Ownership distribution of observations, gross sample 
 
As diagram 2 shows, the gross sample of 2 506 banks over 10 years included 20 793 
observations with reported values. The distribution of ownership was 1 818 observations for 
savings banks, 3 418 for listed banks and 15 557 for private banks. When compared to the 
distribution of the banks, it shows that the number of missing values of savings banks is 
relatively few compared to the number of missing values of listed and private banks. Note 
that the missing values of private and listed banks should be seen as one group due to the 
variation over time in banks’ listing status. 
 
The distribution of ownership in diagram 2 should be compared to the distribution of the final 
sample used to conduct the tests, presented in Diagram 3 on the following page. The third 
diagram illustrates the ownership distribution of observations with known values for all the 
variables included in the model, and after applying the threshold to have at least 1 billion in 
total assets and dropping observations in the first and 99th percentile of gross charge-offs and 
loan loss provisions to total assets.  
  
1818
3418
15557
Savings Listed
Private
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Diagram 3 – Ownership distribution of observations, final sample 
 
Compared to the number of observations in the gross sample, the final sample size is 
significantly smaller, mainly due to the exclusion of observations without observed values for 
all the variables. The diagram shows that the number of observations of each ownership form 
are 753 (10.07 %) savings banks, 1 789 (23.93 %) listed banks and 4 935 (66.00 %) private 
banks, which equals 7 477 observations in total. While the final sample size is noticeably 
smaller compared to the gross sample (20 793), the distribution of ownership forms is fairly 
stable, meaning that the exclusion of observations is, in relative terms, about the same for all 
groups. Further on, the presented descriptive statistics are referring to the sample in diagram 
3.  
5.1.3	  SAMPLE	  CHARACTERISTICS	  
Five tables illustrate the composition of the sample characteristics. First, Table A shows 
descriptive statistics of the variables when all forms of ownership are included. The second 
table illustrates the distribution of observations during the timeframe of 10 years and the 
following three shows the descriptive statistics of each ownership structure. It should be 
noted that the descriptive statistics do not provide any significantly proven conditions, and 
should mainly be seen as a tool used to illustrate the sample characteristics. 
 
Table A – Descriptive statistics, all observations 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
GCO 7477 0.00597 0.00749 5.54e-08 0.0512 
LLP 7477 0.00570 0.00759 -0.00132 0.0515 
LogTA 7477 15.08 1.388 13.82 21.58 
Loan/TA 7477 0.645 0.140 0.00168 0.992 
GDPGR 7477 1.608 1.923 -2.802 3.798 
RTCR 7477 0.147 0.0634 -0.137 1.607 
OP 7477 254795 1.878e+06 -5.760e+07 3.280e+07 
TA 7477 2.600e+07 1.490e+08 1.000e+06 2.360e+09 
Variable definition: 
GCO is gross charge-offs in year t+1 to total assets in the beginning of the year; LLP is loan loss provision in year t to total assets in the 
beginning of year; LogTA is the logarithm of total assets in year; Loans/TA is total loans to total assets in year t; GDPGR is the GDP 
growth in year t; RTCR is regulatory total capital ratio in year t; OP is operating profits in year t; TA is total assets in year t. 
 
 
23.93%
66%
10.07%
1789
4935
753
Savings banks Listed banks
Private banks
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Table A (previous page) includes observations of total assets to illustrate the wide size-
spectra of the banks. As shown, there is a major difference in size between the largest bank, 
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co, and the smallest, Ameriserv Financial Bank Pennsylvania, which 
total assets slightly exceeds the threshold of 1 billion USD. Besides the difference in size, the 
most notable observation is the lowest value of regulatory total capital ratio of -13.7 %5. The 
lowest observation of operating profit belongs to the second largest bank, Citigroup Inc., 
during the financial crisis in 2008. Citigroup Inc. also holds the third and fourth largest 
observations of operating profit in 2005, respectively 2006. To illustrate the economic 
situation in 2008, the operating profit of Citigroup dropped about 80 billion dollars compared 
to 2006. 
 
Table B - Observations per year 
Year Freq. Percent Cum. 
2012 1,078 14.42 14.42 
2011 1,045 13.98 28.39 
2010 983 13.15 41.54 
2009 907 12.13 53.67 
2008 781 10.45 64.12 
2007 722 9.660 73.77 
2006 621 8.310 82.08 
2005 554 7.410 89.49 
2004 400 5.350 94.84 
2003 386 5.160 100 
Total 7,477 100  
 
Table B shows the distribution of observations over time, or in other words, the number of 
observations in period t. An observation in period t includes values of all of the variables in 
period t, except for GCO that states the value reported in period t+1. The distribution over 
time is important as a background to the regression results. As shown in table B, the number 
of observations is skewed towards earlier years, which should place the emphasis of the 
regression results on more recent observations.  
 
 
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  This figure belongs to Taunus Corporation in 2008. While the authors did not have access to the original 
documents of Taunus Corporation, the National Information Center (NIC) provides reports from Taunus 
Corporation stretching back to March 31st 2009. The quarterly report of March 2009 shows a negative capital 
ratio of 12.40 %, which makes it reasonable to assume that the figure of -13.7 % in 2008 is correct.	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5.1.4	  DESCRIPTIVE	  STATISTICS	  BY	  OWNERSHIP	  
The following tables attend to each ownership structure and display the different 
characteristics of the different ownership forms. The order of presentation is savings, listed 
and lastly private banks. 
 
Table C - Savings banks 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
GCO 753 0.00522 0.00764 4.96e-07 0.0445 
LLP 753 0.00488 0.00710 -0.00125 0.0444 
LogTA 753 14.99 0.992 13.82 17.92 
Loan/TA 753 0.672 0.166 0.102 0.992 
GDPGR 753 1.725 1.892 -2.802 3.798 
RTCR 753 0.177 0.0797 0.0292 0.619 
OP 753 66288 224950 -2.364e+06 2.538e+06 
TA 753 6.018e+06 9.177e+06 1.006e+06 6.060e+07 
Variable definition: see table A 
 
Table D - Listed banks 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
GCO 1789 0.00653 0.00745 8.73e-07 0.0511 
LLP 1789 0.00646 0.00811 -0.00123 0.0515 
LogTA 1789 15.39 1.631 13.82 21.58 
Loan/TA 1789 0.641 0.128 0.0525 0.938 
GDPGR 1789 1.517 1.985 -2.802 3.798 
RTCR 1789 0.146 0.0466 -0.0263 0.753 
OP 1789 507614 3.111e+06 -5.760e+07 3.280e+07 
TA 1789 5.110e+07 2.430e+08 1.000e+06 2.360e+09 
Variable definition: see table A 
 
Table E - Private banks 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
GCO 4935 0.00589 0.00746 5.54e-08 0.0512 
LLP 4935 0.00554 0.00745 -0.00132 0.0511 
LogTA 4935 14.99 1.327 13.82 21.36 
Loan/TA 4935 0.642 0.139 0.00168 0.992 
GDPGR 4935 1.623 1.904 -2.802 3.798 
RTCR 4935 0.143 0.0647 -0.137 1.607 
OP 4935 191896 1.341e+06 -1.340e+07 2.690e+07 
TA 4935 1.990e+07 1.090e+08 1.000e+06 1.900e+09 
Variable definition: see table A 
 
First off, a comparison of the means of the variables GCO and LLP shows that savings banks 
in general have lower ratios compared to the other forms of ownership, given the fact that the 
standard errors are similar. Even though this observation does not conclude anything in terms 
of accounting quality, it is of interest since the savings banks’ mean of loans to total assets 
are higher than the others. Another empirical finding displayed in the tables is the difference 
in the size of the banks, between each ownership form. As expected, savings banks are in 
general the smallest and listed banks have the largest mean of total assets. 	   	  
	   26	  
5.2	  REGRESSION	  RESULTS	  	  
The results of the regression models are presented in Table F below. The first column 
describes the outcome of testing the first model. The second column shows the result of the 
first model when using change in GDP as a control variable instead of year dummies. The 
outcome of the second model, when testing savings banks against all other ownership forms 
is presented in the third column while the fourth column illustrates the result of testing listed 
banks against all the other forms of ownership. As mentioned in chapter 4, all the test results 
are based on an OLS model with robust standard errors. 
 
 
Table F - Regression results 
Dependent 
variable 
Model 1 (Year) Model 1 (GDP) Model 2 Model 2 
GCO GCO GCO GCO 
Independent 
variables 
    
     
LLP 0.713*** 0.690*** 0.694*** 0.722*** 
 (0.0208) (0.0202) (0.0181) (0.0200) 
     
SAV -0.000805*** -0.000816*** -0.000883***  
 (0.000215) (0.000216) (0.000212)  
     
LLP*SAV 0.0624 0.0650 0.0821  
 (0.0573) (0.0584) (0.0563)  
     
LIST 0.000270 0.000179  0.000379* 
 (0.000169) (0.000171)  (0.000166) 
     
LLP*LIST -0.0643+ -0.0640+  -0.0726* 
 (0.0338) (0.0342)  (0.0333) 
     
Constant -0.00943*** -0.00886*** -0.00933*** -0.00933*** 
 (0.000855) (0.000899) (0.000845) (0.000844) 
N 7477 7477 7477 7477 
adj. R2 0.601 0.576 0.600 0.601 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
+ p < 0.05, * p < 0.025, ** p < 0.005, *** p < 0.0005, one-tailed 
See Appendix 1 for outcome of controls 
Variable definition: GCO is gross charge-offs in year t+1 to total assets in the beginning of the year; LLP is 
loan loss provision in year t to total assets in the beginning of year; SAV is a dummy variable taking the value 1 
if the bank is a savings bank in period t; LLP*SAV is an interaction term of LLP and SAV LIST is a dummy 
variable taking the value 1 if the bank is a listed bank in period t; LLP*LIST is an interaction term of LLP and 
LIST 
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5.2.1	  SAVINGS	  BANKS	  
MODEL 1 
 𝐺𝐶𝑂!,!!! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐿𝐿𝑃!,! + 𝛽!𝑆𝐴𝑉!,! + 𝛽!𝐿𝐿𝑃!,! ∗ 𝑆𝐴𝑉!,! + 𝛽!𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇!,! + 𝛽!𝐿𝐿𝑃!,! ∗ 𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇!,!+ 𝜀!,! 
 
Model 1 tests the accounting quality of savings banks against the control group of private 
banks. The variable of interest is the interaction variables between LLP and the SAV 
ownership dummy. To conclude the accounting quality the sign of the coefficient is of 
interest, along with the significance level. 
 
As seen in table F, the coefficient of the interaction term LLP*SAV is positive with 0.0642 
and the standard error is 0.0573. These values do not support a difference compared to 
private banks, at the significance level of 5 %. The results are about the same when GDP 
growth is used as a control variable, as shown in column 2. The adjusted R square for Model 
1 with year dummies is 0.601, respectively 0.571 when including GDP growth. 
 
MODEL 2 
In difference from Model 1, the second model does not distinguish private banks as the 
control group; instead the control group consists of all banks not included in the single 
treatment group. This means that the model is different for the tests presented in the third and 
fourth column in table F. 
 
To test savings banks against all the other banks, the following model is used: 
 𝐺𝐶𝑂!,!!! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐿𝐿𝑃!,! + 𝛽!𝑆𝐴𝑉!,! + 𝛽!𝐿𝐿𝑃!,! ∗ 𝑆𝐴𝑉!,! + 𝜀!,! 
 
In Model 2, the variable of interest is the interaction term LLP*SAV in the third 
column.  The variable shows a positive coefficient of 0.0821 and a standard error of 0.0563. 
However, these values does not support a difference in LLP’s predictive power compared to 
the control group of listed and private banks at a significance level of 5 % of an one tailed 
test. The adjusted R square of the model is 0.6. 
 
5.2.2	  LISTED	  BANKS	  
MODEL 1 
 𝐺𝐶𝑂!,!!! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐿𝐿𝑃!,! + 𝛽!𝑆𝐴𝑉!,! + 𝛽!𝐿𝐿𝑃!,! ∗ 𝑆𝐴𝑉!,! + 𝛽!𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇!,! + 𝛽!𝐿𝐿𝑃!,! ∗ 𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇!,!+ 𝜀!,! 
 
Model 1 tests the accounting quality of listed banks against the control group of private 
banks. The variable of interest is the interaction variables between LLP and the ownership 
dummy LIST. The difference in accounting quality is decided by the sign of the coefficient of 
the interaction, along with the significance level.  
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The coefficient of LLP*LIST is negative with a value of -0.0643 and a standard error of 
0.0338. This supports a difference in LLP’s predictive power compared to private banks at a 
significance level of 5 % in a one-tailed test. The result when GDP growth is used as a 
control variable is similar and supports a difference at a significance level of 5 %. 
 
MODEL 2 
The following model is used to test listed banks against the control group of all other banks: 
 𝐺𝐶𝑂!,!!! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐿𝐿𝑃!,! + 𝛽!𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇!,! + 𝛽!𝐿𝐿𝑃!,! ∗ 𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇!,! + 𝜀!,! 
 
The results are displayed in the fourth column; the coefficient of the interaction term is -
0.0726, with a standard error of 0.0333. As shown, this estimation supports a difference in 
LLPs’ predictive power within a significance level of 5 %. The adjusted R square for the 
model is 0.601. 
 
5.2.3	  CONTROL	  VARIABLES	  
The outcome of the control variables is in general significant on low levels. This indicates 
that the level of GCO in the subsequent year is highly affected by the control variables in 
section 4.1.2. To address the sign of the coefficients, all continuous control variables are 
positively correlated with level of GCO, except annual GDP growth, which naturally shows a 
negative coefficient. Note that the interpretation of the control variable LogTA differs from 
the others, since it is the logarithm of total assets. Consequently, the coefficient of LogTA 
states the 𝛽/100 change of the dependent variable, given a percentage change in total assets. 
The variable that shows the lowest p-value out of all in the test is the year dummy of 2008, 
stating that the year of 2008 had a major impact on GCO. The outcome of all the variables of 
the tests is displayed in Appendix 1. 
 
5.2.4	  TESTING	  ASSUMPTIONS	  OF	  THE	  OLS	  MODEL	  
The assumptions of the OLS model are important to evaluate the validity of the models used 
to retrieve the results in table F. This section attends briefly to the most important 
assumptions of this study. As the models are similar this section attends to the model used for 
the results in column 1 in table F. 
 
First off, the VIFs for model 1 are used to check for collinearity between the independent 
variables, these are displayed in Appendix 3. The VIFs shows no indication of a 
multicollinearity problem; the highest VIF is 2.126 for LLP*LIST, when excluding the year 
dummies. Secondly, as stated in chapter 4, the pre-test showed a tendency of 
heteroscedasticity of the residuals. This is also the case for the regression in table F. Since the 
regression results are based robust standard errors, the heteroscedasticity have been taken into 
account. An additional test without using robust standard errors (i.e. a regular OLS) showed 
significant coefficients of all interaction terms. Considering the heteroscedasticity, these 
results are not as valid as the ones presented in Table F. Lastly, the normality of the residuals 
is displayed in Appendix 4. The diagram shows that the residuals are not perfectly normal, 
with a heavy emphasis of residuals around zero.   
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5.2.5	  SENSITIVITY	  ANALYSIS	  
Since the OLS is sensitive to extreme observations additional tests were performed in order 
to test the sensitivity of the results in Table F. The difference between the main tests is that 
the outliers in the regression were adjusted by dropping observations with studentized 
residuals6 of absolute values larger than |2|, which is considered as an indicator of an outlier 
residual (Rahmatullah, 2005). Table G shows the results of running the same tests as in table 
F but with the exclusion of the observations that have studentized residuals larger than |2|. 
The number of observations in each test should be compared with 7 477, which is the number 
of observations in Table F. 
 
Table G - Regressions without observations with studentized residuals >|2| 
Dependent 
variable 
Model 1 (Year) Model 1 (GDP) Model 2 Model 2 
GCO GCO GCO GCO 
Independent 
variables 
    
LLP 0.711*** 0.676*** 0.695*** 0.727*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0108) (0.00962) (0.0112) 
     
SAV -0.000660*** -0.000675*** -0.000711***  
 (0.000113) (0.000119) (0.000111)  
     
LLP*SAV 0.109*** 0.107** 0.122***  
 (0.0300) (0.0325) (0.0294)  
     
LIST 0.000221* 0.000107  0.000335*** 
 (0.0000926) (0.0000937)  (0.0000918) 
     
LLP*LIST -0.0493** -0.0433*  -0.0654*** 
 (0.0182) (0.0184)  (0.0180) 
Constant -0.00608*** -0.00556*** -0.00610*** -0.00608*** 
 (0.000502) (0.000530) (0.000491) (0.000501) 
N 7061 7048 7064 7065 
adj. R2 0.768 0.746 0.764 0.767 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.05, * p < 0.025, ** p < 0.005, *** p < 0.0005, one-tailed 
See Appendix 2 for outcome of controls 
Variable definition: GCO is gross charge-offs in year t+1 to total assets in the beginning of the year; LLP is 
loan loss provision in year t to total assets in the beginning of year; SAV is a dummy variable taking the value 1 
if the bank is a savings bank in period t; LLP*SAV is an interaction term of LLP and SAV LIST is a dummy 
variable taking the value 1 if the bank is a listed bank in period t; LLP*LIST is an interaction term of LLP and 
LIST 
 
 
Table G shows significant values in the interaction terms in all the tests and also higher 
values of adjusted R square compared to the tests in Table F. The number of observations 
dropped in each test varies around 420, which is about 6 % in total. The control variables of 
the test in Table G shows, as in the previous tests, significant coefficients, however the 
variables total capital ratio and operating profits shows higher p-values than in the test in 
Table F. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  for derivation see A Dictionary of Statistics (Upton & Cook, 2008), available via subscription at 
http://www.oxfordreference.com	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These tests should be seen as complements, to illustrate the weakness of the OLS when 
including observations that generate extreme residuals. For the purpose of interpretation it 
should be said that the exclusion of extreme values naturally provides smaller standard errors, 
and hence smaller p-values. While the results in table G rely on a modified data set, the 
results in Table F shows the same sign of the coefficients for the interaction terms. This 
shows that the results in table F might be underestimated, leading to a higher risk of type II 
error.    
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6.	  ANALYSIS	  
The following chapter analyses the results of the tests and connects them with the empirical 
context. It also discusses however the findings are consistent or not with prior research. 
First, the results concerning savings banks are discussed, followed by the results regarding 
listed banks.  
 6.1	  SAVINGS	  BANKS	  
In the hypothesis development in section 3.1, the certain characteristics of savings banks was 
assumed to lead to a better accounting quality compared to private banks, which led to the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H1a: The ability of LLP to predict GCO in the subsequent period is higher for savings banks 
than private banks. 
 
When interpreting the regression results a better accounting quality is equivalent to a positive 
coefficient of the interaction term SAV*LLP. The reasoning is as follows: a positive 
coefficient of the interaction term states that the correlation between loan loss provisions and 
gross charge-offs of savings banks is higher than the one linked to private banks. While the 
empirical findings showed a positive coefficient, the difference was not significant, leading to 
the conclusion that the hypothesis is not supported. 
 
The second hypothesis examines if the accounting quality of savings banks are better than 
other ownership forms.  
 
H1b: The ability of LLP to predict GCO in the subsequent period is higher for savings banks 
compared to all other natures of ownership. 
 
As listed banks are assumed to have worse accounting quality compared to private banks, the 
second hypothesis is still of interest when including listed banks in the control group. 
However, the conclusion derived from the regression results is the same as for the first 
hypothesis. The coefficient of the interaction term shows a positive value, but the difference 
is not significant compared to the other forms of ownership. 
 
In contrast, the tests excluding extreme observations show a significant difference of savings 
banks in both hypotheses above. While the sensitivity tests suggest a significant difference, 
one should note that those results rely on a modified data set, leading to significantly smaller 
standard errors. As the method used in this study already made modifications to extreme 
values by excluding observations in the 1st and 99th percentile of GCO and LLP, further 
outlier treatment is not supported. To not base the analysis on the results excluding the 
observations that generate large residuals is a more cautious approach considering the 
applicability of the results on the population. 
 
In the hypotheses development, the certain characteristics of savings banks as non-profit 
maximizing banks and the absence of influential shareholders implied lower incentives for 
earnings management, in line with Cheng and Warfield (2005). The lower incentives for 
earnings management were hypothesized to generate a higher accounting quality. Even if the 
above findings indicate a higher accounting quality in savings banks, they do not provide 
sufficient evidence to support this hypothesis. 
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Even if the results do not conclude if there indeed is lower pressure on meeting expectations 
or lower focus on maximizing profits in savings banks compared to other banks, they do 
conclude that it does not affect the accounting quality. Consequently, the results suggest that 
whether a bank is share-owned or a mutually held savings bank do not affect the accounting 
quality.  
 
Furthermore, Fields et al. (2001) argued that managers of share-owned banks (private and 
listed) act on their private benefit, as a result of the commonly used share-based 
compensations. This prediction was based on the absence of shares in savings banks, since 
higher managerial incentives for earnings management in share-owned banks was 
hypothesized as an indication of lower accounting quality. As this hypothesis could not be 
proven, the results are in line with Benston’s (1972) predictions that managers in savings 
banks do not act differently from other banks. 
 
A reason for the non-significant difference could be that the incentives for capital 
management are higher than expected, leading to a contraposition of the two incentives, 
which could nullify the effect on the accounting quality. This argument was emphasized as a 
possible factor in the hypothesis development, due to savings banks’ geographic boundaries 
and the certain focus on the low and middle class. However, this explanation seems unlikely 
since the total capital ratio shows an indication (not significantly proven) of higher ratios for 
savings banks, which would indicate less incentive to manage capital levels via loan loss 
provision. The higher quality of assets in mutually held banks is supported by Iannotta et al. 
(2007). An additional explanation that appears more adequate is found when analyzing the 
outcome of the control variables (shown in Appendix 1). As all the control variables showed 
significant coefficients, they are better indicators of the level of accounting quality than 
whether the bank is a savings bank or not. 
 6.2	  LISTED	  BANKS	  
In the hypothesis development concerning the accounting quality of listed banks, the certain 
characteristics were analyzed and compared to privately owned banks, leading to the 
following hypothesis:   
 
H2a: The ability of LLP to predict GCO in the subsequent period is lower for listed banks 
than private banks. 
 
The interpretation of the regression results to determine whether listed banks have a lower 
accounting quality is achieved in a similar manner as for savings banks. If the accounting 
quality in listed banks is indeed lower, the interaction term LLP*LIST shows a negative 
coefficient, meaning that LLP generated by listed banks is less positively correlated with 
GCO in the subsequent period, compared to LLP of private banks. When analyzing the 
output of the regressions the interaction term shows a negative coefficient. The difference 
compared to private banks is significant on a 5 % level of a one-tailed test. This leads to the 
conclusion that conditions stated in the hypothesis is supported.  
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The second part of the hypothesis regarding listed banks states the same conditions as above, 
with the exception that savings banks are included in the control group.  
 
H2b: The ability of LLP to predict GCO in the subsequent period is lower for listed banks 
compared to non-listed banks. 
  
As the tests for savings banks showed a positive coefficient (even though not significant) one 
could expect a larger difference between listed banks and the control group compared to the 
first hypothesis. Consequently, the interaction term in the second test shows a negative 
coefficient within a significance level of 5 % of a one-tailed test, which confirms the lower 
accounting quality of listed banks compared to non-listed banks. Compared to the test for the 
first hypothesis, this test shows a larger coefficient of the interaction term combined with a 
lower standard error, leading to higher t-value and hence a lower p-value. 
 
The results support both hypotheses and the predictions made in the development of the 
hypotheses. This may be explained by the increased incentives for both earnings and capital 
management, as listed banks need to be perceived as low-risk and attractive investments, 
which is indicated by stable earnings and adequate capital ratios (Rivard et al, 2003; Fonseca 
& González, 2008). Consequently, listed banks were assumed to engage in earnings and 
capital management via loan loss provisions to a larger extent compared to non-listed banks, 
leading to a lower accounting quality. In addition, it was argued that managers of listed banks 
exhibit less direct monitoring from owners, which gives them more of a leeway to act on own 
objectives, which could be influenced by situation when the compensation systems are tied to 
the share price (Cornett et al., 2009). This was argued to increase the incentives for short-
term goals and earnings management. 
 
The model did not investigate whether earnings or capital management was the specific 
determinant, but in accordance with Anandarajan et al. (2007), the results do indicate that the 
manipulation of loan loss provisions in listed banks are higher than in non-listed banks. 
Furthermore, it was argued that listed banks are subject to stricter enforcement, which has 
been proven to decrease the incentives for capital management (Fonseca & Gonzalez, 2008), 
leading to a lower accounting quality. As the results of this study state otherwise it indicates 
that the level of enforcement is not as important when determining accounting quality in 
banks. On the other hand, as the incurred loss model itself has been proved to have an 
inherent weakness when determining future gross charge-offs (Marton & Runesson, 2012), 
the higher level of enforcement might not affect loan loss provisions’ predictive power to the 
same extent as other factors. 
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7.	  SUMMARY	  
The final chapter presents a short summary of this study and answers to the research 
questions along with our conclusions. Suggestions for further research to complement the 
findings of this study are also given.  	  7.1	  CONCLUSIONS	  
The purpose of this study was to investigate how bank’s accounting quality, and 
consequently the quality of information provided to stakeholders, is affected by owners of 
different natures. To reach a conclusion, this study used the ability of loan loss provisions to 
predict gross charge-offs in the subsequent period as a measure of accounting quality. A 
sample of 2 506 US banks was used, which included three ownership forms: savings, listed 
and private banks. The unique characteristics of ownership were analyzed according to 
different incentives of earnings and capital management through manipulation of loan loss 
provisions. This analysis resulted in a development of four hypotheses examining the 
accounting quality of each form of ownership, which were tested through two OLS models. 
To broaden the analysis and to reach a conclusion of the research questions, the results of the 
regression was compared with the analysis leading up to the hypotheses in order to examine 
the underlying factors of the results.   
 
So, what do the findings of this study say about how the nature of the owners affects the 
accounting quality? Yes, it does affect the accounting quality to some extent. The results 
showed a difference in accounting quality between certain ownership forms, while the 
difference between others was not supported. The accounting quality of listed banks was 
shown to be lower compared to both private banks and in comparison with all non-listed 
banks. However, savings banks was hypothesized to provide higher accounting quality 
compared to both private banks and compared to private and listed banks as one group. These 
hypotheses were not supported. 
 
In the case of listed banks, the lower accounting quality was attributed to a higher pressure 
from the market, leading to higher incentives for both earnings and capital management 
compared with the others. As listed banks are dependent of attracting investors on the stock 
market the incentives for showing stable income was considered to be higher. An additional 
explanation was discussed to be a higher pressure to reach adequate capital ratios, leading to 
higher incentives for capital management. Furthermore, the accounting quality was discussed 
to be affected by a more dispersed ownership and less monitoring from shareholders, giving 
managers a leeway to pursue their own objectives.  
 
Savings banks showed an indication of having higher accounting quality compared to the 
others, but the difference was not significant. Initially the not-for-profit characteristics and 
absence of pressure from shareholders of savings banks was argued to lead to lower 
incentives for earnings management, hence higher accounting quality. In contrast, the results 
stated that the accounting quality in savings banks in fact is similar to private banks. In this 
case the accounting quality of each bank was discussed to be more strongly tied to extraneous 
factors, other than if it is a private or savings bank.  
 
The findings of this study can be of importance for all stakeholders in the banking industry 
when evaluating information. As it has been proven to be a difference in the quality of 
information, the findings are of particular importance for bank regulators and standard setters 
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to assists their mission to ensure that the information is comparative between banks. In 
addition it emphasizes to further evaluate and improve the internal and external controls to 
ensure the soundness of banks. Given the similarity in accounting standards and the certain 
characteristics of each nature of ownership, there is reason to believe that the results of 
accounting quality in listed banks is more easily applicable to the EU, than the results of 
savings banks. This is based on the fact that the characteristics of listed banks and private 
banks are similar to the EU, while the characteristics of savings banks differ in different 
regions due to their local establishments. 
 7.2	  SUGGESTED	  FURTHER	  RESEARCH	  
To more deeply explain the effect of ownership on accounting quality we have found three 
additional aspects to investigate. First aspect considers how the ownership concentration 
might affect the accounting quality in addition to the nature of the owners. The effect of 
ownership concentration on earnings management has been studied by Bouvatier et al. 
(2014). However, it has not been examine how it affects the accounting quality, in terms of 
LLPs’ predictive power of future GCO. This would give further understanding how the 
ownership affects the accounting quality.  
 
An additional aspect that requires further research is a cross-country study of savings banks. 
As the characteristics of savings banks differs in different countries due to their local focus, it 
might  
 
Furthermore, as discussed in section 2.2, banks in the US are subject to both federal and state 
regulation. The US dual banking system differentiates itself from most other countries, which 
leads us to believe that it might have a unique effect on the incentives for earnings or capital 
management through loan loss provisions. This could be another aspect, to investigate if it 
creates differences in accounting quality depending on what level banks are chartered. 
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APPENDIX	  1	  
Table F Regression results - with controls 
Dependent 
variable 
Model 1 (Year) Model 1 (GDP) Model 2 Model 2 
 GCO GCO GCO GCO 
Independent 
variables 
    
     
LLP 0.713*** 0.690*** 0.694*** 0.722*** 
 (0.0208) (0.0202) (0.0181) (0.0200) 
     
SAV -0.000805*** -0.000816*** -0.000883***  
 (0.000215) (0.000216) (0.000212)  
     
LLP*SAV 0.0624 0.0650 0.0821  
 (0.0573) (0.0584) (0.0563)  
     
LIST 0.000270 0.000179  0.000379* 
 (0.000169) (0.000171)  (0.000166) 
     
LLP*LIST -0.0643+ -0.0640+  -0.0726* 
 (0.0338) (0.0342)  (0.0333) 
     
Loan/TA 0.00601*** 0.00713*** 0.00605*** 0.00587*** 
 (0.000454) (0.000472) (0.000457) (0.000446) 
     
LogTA 0.000388*** 0.000431*** 0.000384*** 0.000383*** 
 (0.0000441) (0.0000470) (0.0000434) (0.0000439) 
     
RTCR 0.00422*** 0.00313** 0.00427*** 0.00357*** 
 (0.00111) (0.00106) (0.00112) (0.00104) 
     
OP 8.20e-11*** 6.29e-11* 8.40e-11*** 8.41e-11*** 
 (2.41e-11) (2.79e-11) (2.40e-11) (2.44e-11) 
     
y2012 -0.000134  -0.000138 -0.0000653 
 (0.000141)  (0.000142) (0.000139) 
     
y2011 0.000853***  0.000856*** 0.000917*** 
 (0.000185)  (0.000185) (0.000183) 
     
y2010 0.000290  0.000282 0.000345 
 (0.000214)  (0.000215) (0.000213) 
     
y2009 0.00105***  0.00103*** 0.00110*** 
 (0.000249)  (0.000250) (0.000249) 
     
y2008 0.00418***  0.00417*** 0.00423*** 
 (0.000246)  (0.000247) (0.000247) 
     
y2007 0.00300***  0.00300*** 0.00305*** 
 (0.000209)  (0.000210) (0.000209) 
     
y2006 0.000805***  0.000802*** 0.000847*** 
 (0.000181)  (0.000181) (0.000181) 
     
y2005 -0.000229+  -0.000226+ -0.000189 
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 (0.000130)  (0.000131) (0.000130) 
     
y2004 0.000314+  0.000312+ 0.000331+ 
 (0.000169)  (0.000170) (0.000170) 
     
GDPGR  -0.000352***   
  (0.0000380)   
     
Constant -0.00943*** -0.00886*** -0.00933*** -0.00933*** 
 (0.000855) (0.000899) (0.000845) (0.000844) 
N 7477 7477 7477 7477 
adj. R2 0.601 0.576 0.600 0.601 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.05, * p < 0.025, ** p < 0.005, *** p < 0.0005, one-tailed 
Variable definition: GCO is gross charge-offs in year t+1 to total assets in the beginning of the year; LLP is 
loan loss provision in year t to total assets in the beginning of year; SAV is a dummy variable taking the value 1 
if the bank is a savings bank in period t; LLP*SAV is an interaction term of LLP and SAV LIST is a dummy 
variable taking the value 1 if the bank is a listed bank in period t; LLP*LIST is an interaction term of LLP and 
LIST; LogTA is the logarithm of total assets in year; Loans/TA is total loans to total assets in year; RTCR is 
regulatory total capital ratio in year t; OP is operating profits in year t; y20xx is dummy variables taking the 
value 1 if the observation is from 20xx; t; GDPGR is the GDP growth in year t; y2003 is the base 
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Regression results without observations with studentized residuals >|2|,  
Table G –with controls, 
Dependent 
variable 
Model 1 (Year) Model 1 (GDP) Model 2 Model 2 
GCO GCO GCO GCO 
Independent 
variables 
    
LLP 0.711*** 0.676*** 0.695*** 0.727*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0108) (0.00962) (0.0112) 
     
SAV -0.000660*** -0.000675*** -0.000711***  
 (0.000113) (0.000119) (0.000111)  
     
LLP*SAV 0.109*** 0.107** 0.122***  
 (0.0300) (0.0325) (0.0294)  
     
LIST 0.000221* 0.000107  0.000335*** 
 (0.0000926) (0.0000937)  (0.0000918) 
     
LLP*LIST -0.0493** -0.0433*  -0.0654*** 
 (0.0182) (0.0184)  (0.0180) 
     
Loan/TA 0.00318*** 0.00381*** 0.00324*** 0.00311*** 
 (0.000258) (0.000256) (0.000257) (0.000256) 
     
LogTA 0.000302*** 0.000337*** 0.000307*** 0.000300*** 
 (0.0000268) (0.0000294) (0.0000259) (0.0000269) 
     
RTCR 0.00143* 0.000300 0.00126* 0.000959+ 
 (0.000592) (0.000536) (0.000547) (0.000576) 
     
OP 4.42e-11** 3.54e-11+ 4.47e-11** 4.48e-11** 
 (1.60e-11) (1.97e-11) (1.47e-11) (1.59e-11) 
     
y2012 0.0000185  0.0000174 0.0000820 
 (0.0000983)  (0.0000982) (0.0000984) 
     
y2011 0.000539***  0.000526*** 0.000572*** 
 (0.000118)  (0.000118) (0.000118) 
     
y2010 -0.0000782  -0.0000733 -0.0000343 
 (0.000121)  (0.000120) (0.000123) 
     
y2009 0.000506***  0.000546*** 0.000527*** 
 (0.000143)  (0.000142) (0.000144) 
     
y2008 0.00308***  0.00309*** 0.00313*** 
 (0.000158)  (0.000158) (0.000159) 
     
y2007 0.00224***  0.00225*** 0.00231*** 
 (0.000129)  (0.000130) (0.000131) 
     
y2006 0.000413***  0.000408*** 0.000448*** 
 (0.0000990)  (0.0000989) (0.0000990) 
     
y2005 -0.000154  -0.000154 -0.000125 
 (0.0000953)  (0.0000954) (0.0000954) 
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y2004 0.000190+  0.000156 0.000205+ 
 (0.000112)  (0.000108) (0.000112) 
     
GDPGR  -0.000258***   
  (0.0000219)   
     
Constant -0.00608*** -0.00556*** -0.00610*** -0.00608*** 
 (0.000502) (0.000530) (0.000491) (0.000501) 
N 7061 7048 7064 7065 
adj. R2 0.768 0.746 0.764 0.767 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.05, * p < 0.025, ** p < 0.005, *** p < 0.0005, one-tailed 
Variable definition: GCO is gross charge-offs in year t+1 to total assets in the beginning of the year; LLP is 
loan loss provision in year t to total assets in the beginning of year; SAV is a dummy variable taking the value 1 
if the bank is a savings bank in period t; LLP*SAV is an interaction term of LLP and SAV LIST is a dummy 
variable taking the value 1 if the bank is a listed bank in period t; LLP*LIST is an interaction term of LLP and 
LIST; LogTA is the logarithm of total assets in year; Loans/TA is total loans to total assets in year; RTCR is 
regulatory total capital ratio in year t; OP is operating profits in year t; y20xx is dummy variables taking the 
value 1 if the observation is from 20xx; t; GDPGR is the GDP growth in year t; y2003 is the base 
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Table of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)  
  
Variables VIF 
LLP 1.877 
SAV 1.612 
LLP*SAV 1.635 
LIST 1.698 
LLP*LIST 2.126 
Loan/TA 1.314 
Log/TA 1.308 
RTCR 1.252 
OP 1.229 
y2012 3.287 
y2011 3.261 
y2010 3.238 
y2009 3.140 
y2008 2.773 
y2007 2.617 
y2006 2.414 
y2005 2.267 
y2004 1.931 
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Normality of the residuals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
